2024 – Choose one of the options below for discussion Be sure to elaborate and explain I choose p 81 Waffles and

 If it were true that the EEOC could prosecute its claim only with Baker’s consent, or if its prayer for relief could be dictated by Baker, the court’s analysis might be persuasive. But once a charge is filed, the exact opposite is true under the statute—the EEOC is in command of the process. The EEOC has exclusive jurisdiction over the claim for 180 days. During that time, the employee must obtain a right-to-sue letter from the agency before prosecuting the claim. If, however, the EEOC files suit on its own, the employee has no independent cause of action, although the employee may intervene in the EEOC’s suit. In fact, the EEOC takes the position that it may pursue a claim on the employee’s behalf even after the employee has disavowed any desire to seek relief. The statute makes the EEOC the master of its own case and confers on the agency the authority to evaluate the strength of the public interest at stake. Absent textual support for a contrary view, it is the public agency’s province—not that of the court—to determine whether public resources should be committed to the recovery of victim-specific relief. And if the agency makes that determination, the statutory text unambiguously authorizes it to proceed in a judicial forum.

   The Court of Appeals … simply sought to balance the policy goals of the FAA against the clear language of Title VII and the agreement. While this may be a more coherent approach, it is inconsistent with our recent arbitration cases. The FAA directs courts to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts, but it “does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.” … Here there is no ambiguity. No one asserts that the EEOC is a party to the contract, or that it agreed to arbitrate its claims. It goes without saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty.

   [T]he statutory language is clear; the EEOC has the authority to pursue victim-specific relief regardless of the forum that the employer and employee have chosen to resolve their disputes. Rather than attempt to split the difference, we are persuaded that, pursuant to Title VII and the ADA, whenever the EEOC chooses from among the many charges filed each year to bring an enforcement action in a particular case, the agency may be seeking to vindicate a public interest, not simply provide make-whole relief for the employee, even when it pursues entirely victim-specific relief.

   The only issue before this Court is whether the fact that Baker has signed a mandatory arbitration agreement limits the remedies available to the EEOC. The text of the relevant statutes provides a clear answer to that question. They do not authorize the courts to balance the competing policies of the ADA and the FAA, or to second-guess the agency’s judgment concerning which of the remedies authorized by law that it shall seek in any given case.

How are previous rules of law and precedents used in Justice Stevens’s reasoning? Is sufficient evidence provided to support the extension of these precedents to this case?

The EEOC filed the claim because of the damages suffered by Baker as a result of Waffle House’s actions. Are there potential alternative causes for the damages suffered by Baker?

CASE NUGGET p43

   Each state has its own minimum-contact requirements, but most state statutes hold that acts like committing a tort or doing business in the state are sufficient to allow the state to serve a defendant. In the opening scenario, the company sold products in Kentucky, and its products caused an injury in that state. These two facts were sufficient minimum contacts to allow the Kentucky court to serve Caterpillar, even though it was an out-of-state company. Compare the facts of the Caterpillar case to those in the Case Nugget, where the court found that the contacts were sufficient to give the court jurisdiction over the out-of-state resident, even when the primary contact in the state was over the telephone.

   In contrast to the situations in the Case Nugget and in the opening scenario, the Florida appellate court did not find minimum contacts with that state to enable a foreign corporation to sue Columbia University, located in New York City, for a tort that allegedly occurred in New York. The court found that the fact that Columbia had alumni associations in Florida, owned some interactive classrooms in that state, and offered some online classes to residents did not constitute sufficient minimum contacts for a lawsuit in which none of the tortuous acts were alleged to have occurred in the state.³

   If a defendant has property in a state, a plaintiff may file suit against the defendant’s property instead of the owner. For example, suppose a Utah resident had not paid property taxes on a piece of land she owned in Idaho. Idaho courts have in rem jurisdictionThe power of a court over the property or status of an out-of-state defendant located within the court’s jurisdiction area. (Latin for “jurisdiction over the thing”) over the property. Thus, an Idaho state court has the power to seize the property and sell it to pay the property taxes in an in rem proceeding.

   Courts can also gain quasi in rem jurisdictionA type of jurisdiction exercised by a court over an out-of-state defendant’s property that is within the jurisdictional boundaries of the court; applies to personal suits against a defendant in which the property is not the source of the conflict but is sought as compensation by the plaintiff. Also called attachment jurisdiction., or attachment jurisdiction, over a defendant’s property unrelated to the plaintiff’s claim. For example, suppose Charlie, a Massachusetts resident, ran a red light while he was vacationing in California and collided with Jessica’s car. Suppose further that Jessica suffered extensive injuries from the accident and successfully sued Charlie for $200,000 in a California state court. The California court can exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over Charlie’s California vacation home by seizing it, selling it, and transferring $200,000 to Jessica to satisfy her judgment against Charlie. If Charlie’s vacation home is worth more than $200,000, however, the court must return the excess proceeds to Charlie.

What is the purpose of the decision that Waffle House made in the facts leading to this case?